1927年日本银行兑换券伍拾圆。 JAPAN. Bank of Japan. 50 Yen, ND (1927). P-37As. Specimen. PMG Gem Uncirculated 66 EPQ. 无编号，通体黑色，边框内饰以多重几何网纹，正上方为菊花纹章，红色见本红色，并有两处穿孔注销。此钞原设计已为单面印刷，存世极为稀少，PMG 评级记录中仅有两张，且此枚品相最佳，诚为凤毛麟角之珍品。关于其发行始末，详情请见下文。恐慌时代的背面空白钞票：昭和初期一句失言引发的昭和金融恐慌1926年（大正十五年）12月25日，大正天皇驾崩，仅数日之后，于1927昭和时代正式开始。然而，这个崭新的时代，却是以一场动盪的金融恐慌作为开端。大正时期的经济政策，犹如空中楼阁，最终导致了这场危机的爆发。追根溯源，此次金融恐慌的根源，在于第一次世界大战结束后的经济衰退。战争需求带来的经济繁荣，在战争结束后迅速破灭，导致经济陷入严重衰退。简而言之，自1914年（大正三年）第一次世界大战爆发以来，日本经历了一段史无前例的经济繁荣期。由于欧洲各国依赖日本满足其日常需求，到1918年（大正七年）战争结束时，日本的出口额已高达28亿日元（相当于现在的2-3万亿日元）。
股票价格飞升，日本银行的钞票发行量也从战前的3亿8000万激增至532亿日元。然而，异常的繁荣衍生出的大正泡沫，随著战争的结束而破灭。过度的资本投资导致了严重的经济衰退，一直持续到1923（大正十二年）。雪上加霜的是，关东大地震的发生，给日本的生产重镇带来了毁灭性的打击，导致股市崩塌，金融机构陷入危机。日本政府与日本银行协商后，同意对灾区的票据进行再贴现，并将其兑付期限推迟两年。这项协议被颁布为地震票据损失赔偿令。这标志著震灾票据制度的成立。虽然该计划于1924年（大正十三年）三月结束，但日本银行的融资馀额却高达4亿3300万日元。当时，日本共有银行1422家，其中许多都是规模较小、实力较弱的银行。这些银行无法在两年的宽限期内赎回震灾票据。因此，政府两次延长了融资期限，将其推迟到1927年（昭和二年）九月底。然而，这种拖延政策面临著越来越多的反对声音。批评人士认为，为了提升日本的国际地位，即使牺牲一些金融机构，也必须採取果断的政策，包括恢复黄金出口。震灾票据的处理问题在国会上引起了激烈辩论。3月15日，在国会审议震灾票据处理法案期间，若槻内阁的大藏大臣片冈直温在回答议员提问时，犯了一个严重的错误，发言：东京的渡边银行，今天中午时分已经破产，需要救助。此话无疑是一枚重磅炸弹。虽然渡边银行在中午时分确实面临著资金周转的困境，但它设法在下午三点的最后期限前结清了票据，并照常营业。然而，大藏大臣的这番言论却引发了民众的恐慌。存户纷纷跑到银行挤兑，迫使渡边银行及其旗下的赤字贮蓄银行关门大吉。
包括中井银行、第十八银行在内的其他几家银行也遭遇了挤兑风潮。然而，这些都只是东京地区的中小型银行，因此恐慌情绪尚在可控范围内。不幸的是，三月份的动盪只不过是一次前震，真正的地震发生在四月。印制背面空白的钞票铃木商店的倒闭是导致此次金融恐慌的重要原因之一。铃木商店是大正时期迅速崛起的一家大型贸易公司，其规模可与三井物产、三菱商事相媲美，但却进行了过度投机。因此，它在经济衰退中遭受重创，累计负债约4亿日元。4亿日元是什麽概念？当时日本的国家预算也才16亿日元，铃木商店的负债就佔了四分之一。更关键的是，在这笔巨额债务中，台湾银行的融资佔了60%。因此，铃木商店一旦倒闭，台湾银行也必然会跟著遭殃，这将严重损害作为宗主国日本的信用。因此，时任首相若槻礼次郎的内阁决定颁布紧急勅令，由政府担保，由日本银行向铃木商店提供特别贷款。然而，由于政党之争，枢密院否决了这一提案，导致若槻内阁总辞职。这一事件进一步加剧了民众的不安情绪，引发了全国又一次银行挤兑风潮。就连十五银行、百三十银行、川崎银行、安田银行等一流银行，包括五大银行在内，也遭遇了大规模的挤兑。最终，包括台湾银行在内的四十四家银行被迫停业。在一片恐慌之中，政友会内阁接替了若槻内阁。虽然高桥是清是政友会的前任主席，但党内干部为了寻求军部的支持，邀请陆军大将田中义一担任新主席。及后，田中义一就任首相，高桥是清则出任大藏大臣。内阁组成后的第二天，高桥是清便採取了果断措施来平定恐慌。他宣布全国银行停业两天（4月22日和23日），并发布了延期支付令，给予金融机构3週的支付宽限期。此前，只要有担保，银行就可以从日本银行提取现金，并将其支付给那些急于提款的存户。
两天的银行停业可谓是及时雨，让许多银行有时间从日本银行筹集现金。然而，日本银行并没有那麽多纸币储备。因此，为了准备银行的重新开业，各家银行甚至未有等待大藏省的指示，就向印刷局紧急订购了500万张二百圆的纸币和50万张伍拾圆的纸币。虽是一无理的要求，但由于日本银行文书局长称这些新印刷仅是做做样子，印刷局只好硬著头皮赶工，以最粗糙的方式生产，务求于限期前交付。首先，在纸张方面，他们决定使用带有水印的日本银行支票纸，并让王子制纸紧急生产。在印版方面，他们则重複使用了证券的印版，印刷以单色黑色印刷，而徽章和主席印章则採用红色压印。然而，即使已简化流程，时间依然紧迫，因此他们做出了一个非比寻常的决定：只印刷正面，背面留白。4月22日，生产开始，到25日银行重新开业当天，511万张二百元终于限期前完成。这些背面空白的钞票堆放于银行的柜檯上。至于伍拾圆，则准备了4万8千张，并于二十七日交付给日本银行。然而，由于钞票攻势成功地平息了恐慌，伍拾圆最终并未发行。在当时，银行职员的起薪是七十日元，即使是当时面值最高的百圆纸币，亦被认为是一笔巨款。因此，二百圆面值其实是一个不切实际的面值，甚至在银行职员中也引起了混乱。
据《百五银行史》记载--
本行派了十五名职员到日本银行提取200万日元的现金，以备挤兑。这是因为他们按照通常的十圆纸币估算，需要13个人，每人拿200捆。然而，他们拿到的是二百圆的纸币，结果只有10捆，才意识到原来一个人就足够了。</em><em>还</em><em>有一次，有两位顾客来提款，支店长正在好言相劝，劝说并无必要，这时银行的总经理看到了这一幕，便说：如果二位不放心，就请跟我来。然后，他带著两位</em><em>顾客来到了金库。他事先从部下那裡听说金库裡有700万日元的现金，所以他打算让顾客看看那一摞摞的钞票。然而，当他们进入金库后，顾客反而更加不信任了。
二百圆的纸币，市场上流通了共值1亿6千200万日元。然而，由于它们并非正式的钞票，因此在金融动盪平息后，当局很快下令将其收回。结果，到八月时，大部分纸币都被送回了日本银行，仅剩十七张下落不明。因此，它们在今天极为罕见。包括样票（现存有一张八连张）和编号为[1]至[3]的流通钞在内，估计总共只有十几张。它们的稀缺性亦反映在它们的价格上。在2002年的一次拍卖会上，一张流通钞的成交价高达710万日元。另一方面，伍拾圆钞券虽已印制，却从未正式发行。因此，现今仅存少数样票，此前并无私人收藏记录。此张纸币，诚为难得一见之珍品，若得之，足以傲视寰宇纸钞收藏界，其地位绝非仅限于亚洲或日本一隅。
Without serial numbers, black, multiple geometric guilloche within borders, chrysanthemum emblem at upper centre, Mi Hon printed in red, two punch hole cancellations. This note was intended to be a uniface note. A phenomenally rare unissued note with a total PMG population of just two notes and this in the HIGHEST GRADE. Please see the below for a detailed history of their production.Panic Era Reverse Plain Banknotes: Early Showa PeriodThe Showa Financial Crisis, Ignited by a Slip of the TongueThe death of Emperor Taisho occurred on December 25, 1926 (Taisho 15), and just a few days later, the year 1927 marked the beginning of the Showa period. However, this new era began with a turbulent financial crisis. The makeshift economic policies of the Taisho era had finally caught up, leading to this crisis.The root cause of this financial crisis lay in the aftermath of World War I.
The economic boom brought about by wartime demand had led to a severe recession.In short, from 1914 (Taisho 3) when World War I began, Japan experienced an unprecedented economic boom. With European countries relying on Japan to fulfill their general demands, Japans exports reached 2.8 billion yen (equivalent to 2-3 trillion yen today) by the wars end in 1918 (Taisho 7). Stock prices soared, and the Bank of Japans note issuance surged from 380 million yen before the war to 53.2 billion yen.However, this abnormal boom, a Taisho-era bubble, burst with the wars end. Excessive capital investment led to a severe recession that continued into 1923 (Taisho 12).Then came the Great Kanto Earthquake, which dealt a devastating blow to the countrys production base, causing stock prices to plummet and throwing financial institutions into crisis. The government, in consultation with the Bank of Japan, agreed to rediscount bills from the disaster area and defer their collection for two years. This agreement was enacted as the Earthquake Bill Loss Compensation Order.This marked the establishment of the earthquake bill system. Although the program closed in March 1924 (Taisho 13), the outstanding balance of Bank of Japan financing reached a staggering 433 million yen. At the time, there were 1,422 banks, many of them small and fragile.
These banks were unable to buy back the earthquake bills within the two-year grace period. Consequently, the government extended the financing period twice, pushing it to the end of September 1927 (Showa 2). However, this policy of postponement faced growing opposition. Critics argued that to enhance Japans international standing, bold policies, including the resumption of gold exports, were necessary, even if it meant the elimination of some financial institutions. The issue of earthquake bill settlement was debated in the Diet.On March 15th, during a Diet session deliberating a bill to settle the bills, Finance Minister Naotake Kataoka of the Wakatsuki Cabinet, in response to a question, made a grave error: Watanabe Bank (in Tokyo) has failed around noon today. It requires assistance.This statement was a terrible blunder. While it was true that Watanabe Bank faced a liquidity crisis at noon, it managed to settle its bills by the 3 p.m. deadline and continued operations as usual. However, the Finance Ministers statement sparked a panic. Depositors rushed to withdraw their money, forcing Watanabe Bank and its affiliated Akaji Savings Bank to close their doors.Several other banks, including Nakai and Daijuhachi, also experienced bank runs. However, these were all small and medium-sized banks in the Tokyo area, so the panic remained relatively contained.Unfortunately, the March turmoil was merely a foreshock. The real earthquake struck in April.Printing Banknotes with Plain ReverseThe collapse of Suzuki Shoten played a significant role in this financial crisis. Suzuki Shoten, a major trading company that had experienced rapid growth during the Taisho era, rivaling Mitsui & Co. and Mitsubishi Trading, had engaged in speculative ventures. As a result, it was hit hard by the recession, accumulating debts of approximately 400 million yen.To put this in perspective, 400 million yen was equivalent to one-fourth of the national budget at the time.
Moreover, the Bank of Taiwan had financed 60% of this massive debt. Consequently, the collapse of Suzuki Shoten would inevitably lead to the failure of the Bank of Taiwan, severely damaging the creditworthiness of Japan, the colonial ruler.Therefore, the incumbent cabinet of Prime Minister Reijiro Wakatsuki decided to issue an imperial ordinance providing a government guarantee for a special loan from the Bank of Japan to Suzuki Shoten. However, due to political conflicts, the Privy Council rejected this proposal, leading to the resignation of the Wakatsuki Cabinet. This further fueled public anxiety, triggering another wave of bank runs across the nation. Even leading banks such as Dai-Jūgo Bank, Dai-Hyaku Bank, Kawasaki Bank, and Yasuda Bank, including the Big Five, faced massive withdrawals. Ultimately, 44 banks, including the Bank of Taiwan, were forced to suspend operations.Amid this panic, the Seiyukai Cabinet replaced the Wakatsuki Cabinet. Although Korekiyo Takahashi was the president of Seiyukai until recently, party executives sought the support of the military and invited Army General Giichi Tanaka to be the new president. Consequently, Tanaka became Prime Minister, and Takahashi assumed the position of Finance Minister.The day after the cabinets formation, Takahashi took drastic measures to quell the panic. He declared a two-day bank holiday (April 22nd and 23rd) and issued a moratorium order granting financial institutions a three-week grace period for payments.Until then, banks had been withdrawing cash from the Bank of Japan as long as they had collateral and were paying it out to the depositors who were rushing to withdraw their money. The two-day bank holiday came as a godsend, giving many banks time to secure cash from the Bank of Japan.However, the Bank of Japan did not possess such a large amount of reserve notes. Therefore, to prepare for the reopening of banks, the banks, without even waiting for instructions from the Ministry of Finance, placed an order with the Printing Bureau for 5 million 200-yen notes and 500,000 50-yen notes.It was an unreasonable order, but since the director of the Bank of Japans document bureau had told them that these are for show, the Printing Bureau decided to make do with the crudest possible production to meet the deadline.
First, for the paper, they decided to use the Bank of Japans check paper with a watermark and have it urgently produced at the Oji Paper Mill. For the printing plates, they reused plates for securities. The printing was done in offset black for one color, and the symbols and the presidents seal were embossed in red. However, even with this simplified process, time was running out, so they made the unusual decision to print only the front side and leave the back blank.Production began on April 22nd, and 5.11 million 200-yen notes were somehow completed by the 25th, the day the banks reopened. These so-called Reverse Plain notes were stacked up at bank counters.As for the 50-yen notes, 48,000 were prepared and delivered to the Bank of Japan on the 27th. However, since the show of money had successfully calmed the panic, the 50-yen notes were never issued.In those days, a bank clerks starting salary was 70 yen, and even the highest denomination banknote at the time, the 100-yen note, was considered a large sum. Therefore, the 200-yen note was an unrealistic denomination, even causing confusion among bank officials. According to the History of the Hyakugo Bank -This bank sent 15 staff members to the Bank of Japan to withdraw 2 million yen in preparation for a bank run. This was because they had estimated that 13 people would be needed, with each person carrying 200 bundles based on the usual 10-yen notes. However, they were given 200-yen notes, which only amounted to 10 bundles, and they realized that one person would have been enough to carry them.There was also an instance where two customers came to withdraw their deposits, and while the branch manager was trying to persuade them that it was unnecessary, the bank president witnessed the situation and said, If you are worried, please come with me. He then led the customers to the vault.
He had been informed by his subordinates that there was 7 million yen in cash, so he intended to show the customers the stacks of banknotes. However, when they entered the vault, it seemed to have fueled their distrust even more.As for the 200-yen notes, 162 million yen worth of them were circulated in the market. However, since they were not proper banknotes, the authorities quickly ordered their collection once the financial unrest subsided. As a result, most of them were returned to the Bank of Japan by August, leaving only 17 unaccounted for. Consequently, they are extremely rare today. Including specimen notes (an eight-note sheet exists) and circulating notes with serial numbers [1] to [3], it is estimated that only a dozen or so exist. Their rarity is reflected in their extraordinary value. In an auction last year (2002), a circulating note fetched 7.1 million yen.On the other hand, while the 50-yen notes were printed, they were never issued. Therefore, only specimen notes exist, and there are no confirmed reports of them being held privately until the presence of this note. A once in a generation opportunity to obtain this note which will be the crowning piece of any World Paper Money collection, not just Asian or Japanese.
